

The structure of social values: Validation of Rokeach's two-value model

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This research sought to investigate the validity of Rokeach's two-dimensional model of political ideology. In two separate studies, samples of Australian adults and university students were asked to complete the Social Values Inventory, a newly derived instrument designed to provide a more detailed coverage of the political ideology domain. Factor analyses of each set of data revealed a basic two-dimensional structure defined as *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*. While this solution only partially supported Rokeach's model, it did bear some resemblance to a typology identified by Scott (1960). The implications of these findings for Rokeach's model are discussed, as are strategies for resolving the present lack of concordance between these conceptual schemata.

In the domain of political ideology, Rokeach (1973) has questioned the adequacy of the traditional reliance on a single liberalism–conservatism continuum. He proposed that a more sophisticated understanding would ensue if political ideologies across time and cultures were conceptualized in terms of two independent value dimensions; one defined by equality, the other by freedom. According to Rokeach, the extremes of these dimensions taken conjointly can be used to typify four major political orientations. Concern for both equality and freedom characterizes socialism; a lack of concern for either equality or freedom identifies fascism; capitalism places value on freedom at the expense of equality; while communism emphasizes equality at the expense of freedom.

The above conceptualization is not without support from researchers interested in the major dimensions underlying the social attitudes domain. As Rokeach acknowledges, the model bears a strong resemblance to Eysenck's (1954) two orthogonal traits, radicalism–conservatism and toughmindedness–tendermindedness, and to Kerlinger's (1967) orthogonal dimensions of liberalism and conservatism. Nevertheless, attempts to find empirical support for the two-value model of political ideology in both Britain and the United States have met with only mixed success.

Validation studies to date have sought to demonstrate that two items in the Rokeach Value Survey, 'equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)' and 'freedom (independence, free choice)', discriminate better than others on politically relevant criterion variables. Criterion variables have included writings representative of major political persuasions (Rokeach, 1973; Rous & Lee, 1978), active and non-active supporters of various political parties and candidates (Bishop *et al.*, 1972; Rokeach, 1973; Cochrane *et al.*, 1979) and student's self-ratings on political ideology (Rokeach, 1973). These studies have demonstrated the potential importance of the value, equality, in explaining differences in political beliefs within Western democratic countries. They have, however, failed to establish the discriminating power of freedom.

Rokeach (1973, 1979) attributes this failure largely to the difficulty in finding criterion groups that have little concern for freedom in democratic societies such as the United States and Britain. He concludes 'that ideological divisions and conflicts in British politics, as also in US politics, are mainly, but admittedly not solely, reducible to divisions and conflicts with respect to one value — equality' (Rokeach, 1979, pp. 171–172).

While this may indeed be the case, the argument is difficult to substantiate empirically until the validity of the freedom measure has been clearly established. Reservations have been expressed regarding the way in which the freedom concept has been operationalized.

Mueller (1974*a, b*) has been particularly critical of Rokeach's measures of both freedom and equality, having been relatively unsuccessful in an attempt to validate these indices by relating them to alternative measures of the constructs. Mueller's results were noticeably less encouraging for the value freedom than for equality. In an effort to explain the absence of predicted differences between political groups on the freedom dimension, Cochrane *et al.* (1979) suggest that the word freedom might have 'deeply different interpretations depending upon ideological context' (p. 166). Furthermore, Rokeach (1973) acknowledges possible changing connotations of the term when he states that 'the meaning of freedom and equality is to be sought in their relation to one another within a particular scale of values' (p. 183).

The problem of some ambiguity in verbal labels, particularly those as polemical and abstract as freedom and equality, is neither surprising nor is it unique to the Value Survey. The consequences are greatly exacerbated in this particular instrument, however, by the fact that each concept is measured by only a single item comprising two or three abstract phrases; a characteristic that has been widely criticized on methodological grounds (Homant, 1970; Mueller, 1974*a*; Kitwood & Smithers, 1975). If the item, 'freedom (independence, free choice)' is particularly vulnerable to different interpretations, and if it is to be the only item recognized as representative of the freedom dimension, it is little wonder that empirical support has been lacking for Rokeach's two-dimensional value structure. The issue of whether studies to date have been providing information on the validity of Rokeach's two-dimensional value model or on the items of the Value Survey can only be resolved by investigating the model through alternative measuring instruments.

A final point of contention in relation to the two-value model is that other items in the Value Survey, in particular, a world at peace, national security, and a world of beauty, have repeatedly been found to discriminate among criterion groups (Rawls *et al.*, 1973; Rokeach, 1973; Rous & Lee, 1978; Cochrane *et al.*, 1979). On this basis, Cochrane *et al.* (1979) have concluded that 'a two-value model is too simple to explain the variation in political beliefs' (p. 166) and that a more elaborate typology is required.

Calling for a more sophisticated model of political ideology on the basis of findings with the Value Survey seems premature. Items that are unexpectedly discriminating on politically relevant criterion variables need not represent independent ideological dimensions. Their discriminatory power could stem from their association with an underlying two-dimensional structure such as that proposed by Rokeach. The fact that support for such a model has not been forthcoming from structural analyses of the Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973, 1974; Feather & Peay, 1975) is hardly surprising. Such undertakings have been seriously handicapped in that there are insufficient values directly relevant to political ideology included in the Value Survey. Until values are more representatively sampled from the domain and interrelationships systematically examined, the optimal dimensionality of a model of political ideology remains open to question.

Thus, before the usefulness of Rokeach's two-value model can be adequately evaluated in a substantive sense, alternative explanations of the available data, arising from problems of measurement, must be tested. It is to this issue that the present research is addressed. First and foremost, an instrument needs to be developed which more comprehensively samples values from the political ideology domain. Ideally, such an instrument would measure each value construct through several variables rather than simply one. Second, the dimensionality of the domain requires investigation. If Rokeach's two-value model is valid, two orthogonal dimensions should be found which account for the majority of the variance and which, at a conceptual level at least, can be identified with the constructs, equality and freedom. Finally, the derived structure must be related to Rokeach's operationalized constructs, 'equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)' and 'freedom

(independence, free choice)'. If a strong relationship can be established, it can be concluded that Rokeach's measures of freedom and equality are representative of the two major orthogonal dimensions underlying the domain of political ideology. In the event that an alternative structure is identified, the question of the validity of the newly derived dimensions must be addressed.

Method

Questionnaires

In order to develop an instrument that provided a more comprehensive and representative coverage of the value domain, intensive interviews were conducted with a sample of 73 adults living in a selected electoral division in the city of Brisbane, Australia. The electorate chosen offered the advantage of a demographically heterogeneous population residing in a relatively confined geographical area. The sample was selected from electoral rolls and consequently could be stratified on sex and occupation. Since electoral enrolment is compulsory for all over the age of 18 years, the electoral roll provided a satisfactory basis for sample selection. The population of the city of Brisbane at the time of the study was 800 000.

The purpose of these interviews was to identify the values that featured most saliently in the political evaluations made by this population. The interviews were semi-structured, but all shared a common starting-point — the Rokeach Value Survey. This approach had the advantage of operationally defining the domain of inquiry for respondents and easing them into a discussion of their own political beliefs and values. Respondents were asked to comment on all aspects of the Value Survey — the nature of the task, the clarity and comprehensiveness of the items, and the changes they would like to see made to the instrument. On this basis, existing items were refined, oftentimes made narrower in scope, and additional items developed. The result was an inventory comprising 18 values considered representative of the political ideology domain.

The response format adopted for this inventory was a seven-point rating scale ranging from rejection to acceptance of the value as of the highest importance as a guiding principle in life. Based on data from a sample of 208 university students, test-retest reliabilities for the items over a four-week period ranged from 0.46 to 0.92 with a median of 0.62. As such, they are comparable to those reported by Rokeach (1973) and Feather (1971) for the Value Survey. The items and their reliabilities are presented in Table 1.

The above inventory was administered to respondents in two independent studies. In the second study, respondents also completed Scott's (1960) Scales of Foreign Policy Goals (these scales were slightly modified with permission of the author for use in an Australian context) and a rating form of the Value Survey. The rating procedure has been found to produce comparable results to ranking, while avoiding the problems posed by ipsative data (Feather, 1973).

Respondents

Study 1. The newly developed Social Values Inventory was mailed to a stratified random sample of adult inhabitants of the city of Brisbane. A two-stage cluster sampling procedure was adopted with eight census statistical areas being sampled first. This sample was stratified on socio-economic status. At the second stage, individuals were selected randomly from these statistical areas using electoral rolls. Respondents were informed that a research worker would call two weeks later to collect completed questionnaires and to answer any queries. The response rate was 61 per cent, giving a total of 483 completed questionnaires. Women comprised 54 per cent of the sample, men 46 per cent. From comparisons with available census information, the sample appeared to be biased towards the higher socio-economic status groups and the middle-age groups. The breakdown by socio-economic status was 31 per cent in the high category (i.e. heads of household in professional or managerial occupations), 49 per cent in the middle category (i.e. heads of household in clerical or sales occupations), and 20 per cent in the low category (i.e. heads of household in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations). Occupations were classified according to the system developed by Broom *et al.*, 1965. The mean age was approximately 42 years.

Study 2. In the second study, the Social Values Inventory together with the Scales of Foreign Policy Goals and a rating form of the Value Survey were administered to 480 introductory psychology students (70 per cent female, 30 per cent male) at the University of Queensland. The questionnaires were completed in a classroom situation as part of a battery of tests administered over a three-week

Table 1. Test-retest reliability coefficients for the items of the Social Values Inventory over a four-week period ($n = 208$)

Social values	r
<i>Freedom</i> — Being able to live as you choose whilst respecting the freedom of others	0.57
<i>A good life for others</i> — improving the welfare of all people in need	0.63
<i>Rule by the people</i> — Involvement by all citizens in making decisions that affect their community	0.46
<i>International cooperation</i> — having all nations working together to help each other	0.53
<i>Social progress and social reform</i> — readiness to change our way of life for the better	0.53
<i>Man's domination of nature</i> — controlling nature and making use of the forces of nature	0.65
<i>A world at peace</i> — being free from war and conflict	0.50
<i>A world of beauty</i> — having the beauty of nature and of the arts (music, literature, art, etc.)	0.63
<i>Reward for individual effort</i> — letting the individual profit from initiative and hard work	0.65
<i>Upholding traditional sexual moral standards</i> — opposing sexual permissiveness and pornography	0.92
<i>Human dignity</i> — allowing each individual to be treated as someone of worth	0.55
<i>National security</i> — protection of your nation from enemies	0.72
<i>Equal opportunity for all</i> — giving everyone an equal chance in life	0.51
<i>Greater economic equality</i> — lessening the gap between the rich and the poor	0.68
<i>The rule of law</i> — punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent	0.61
<i>National greatness</i> — being a united, strong, independent and powerful nation	0.72
<i>Preserving the natural environment</i> — preventing the destruction of nature's beauty and resources	0.62
<i>National economic development</i> — having greater economic progress and prosperity for the nation	0.64

period. The order of presentation of the instruments was systematically varied. Anonymity was maintained for all respondents throughout the study.

Results

Study 1. An 18 by 18 Pearson product moment correlation matrix was factor analysed using the principal axes method with iteration (Nie *et al.*, 1975). Five factors, together accounting for 60.8 per cent of the variance in the item set, satisfied the Kaiser–Guttman number of factors criterion (Guttman, 1954; Kaiser, 1960) by having eigenvalues greater than 1.0. The five factors were subsequently rotated using the varimax procedure (Kaiser, 1958).

From Table 2, the first factor accounted for over half the variance in the factor solution (58.0 per cent) and was defined most strongly by the items, 'international cooperation', 'a good life for others', 'social progress and social reform', 'greater economic equality', 'equal opportunity for all', 'rule by the people', and 'a world at peace'. Together these items suggest an ideology directed toward the attainment of a more cooperative, equitable and humanistic social order. The factor is labelled *international harmony and equality*.

The second factor was also reasonably substantial, accounting for 19.5 per cent of the variance in the factor solution. The items loading most highly on this factor were 'national greatness', 'national security', 'national economic development', and 'the rule of law'. The emphasis on economic and political might coupled with the goal of internal order implies a nationalistic, if not authoritarian, ideological orientation. Pursuit of *national strength and order* appears to be an appropriate description of factor 2.

The remaining 22.5 per cent of the variance was distributed across three notably smaller

Table 2. Factor loadings for the Social Values Inventory after varimax rotation

Social values	Factor				
	1	2	3	4	5
Freedom	0.18 (0.42)	0.07 (0.12)	0.40	0.04 (-0.31)	0.09 (0.27)
A good life for others	0.61 (0.77)	0.10 (-0.06)	0.15	0.23 (0.03)	0.13 (0.12)
Rule by the people	0.51 (0.55)	0.16 (0.19)	0.17	-0.04 (-0.07)	0.05 (0.16)
International cooperation	0.71 (0.63)	0.12 (0.09)	0.15	0.11 (0.10)	0.16 (0.26)
Social progress and social reform	0.68 (0.58)	0.03 (0.15)	0.25	0.01 (-0.11)	0.00 (0.24)
Man's domination of nature	0.22 (0.10)	0.26 (0.41)	0.23	0.00 (0.04)	-0.32 (-0.07)
A world of peace	0.43 (0.54)	0.18 (0.15)	0.08	0.15 (0.08)	0.21 (0.34)
A world of beauty	0.33 (0.40)	0.09 (0.12)	0.33	0.08 (0.04)	0.44 (0.61)
Reward for individual effort	0.01 (0.08)	0.29 (0.51)	0.70	0.10 (-0.07)	0.01 (0.31)
Upholding traditional sexual moral standards	0.10 (0.09)	0.25 (0.21)	0.01	0.71 (0.69)	-0.03 (0.02)
Human dignity	0.38 (0.57)	0.08 (0.12)	0.23	0.51 (0.10)	0.12 (0.21)
National security	0.05 (0.09)	0.75 (0.75)	0.14	0.24 (0.20)	0.10 (0.05)
Equal opportunity for all	0.53 (0.71)	0.25 (0.15)	0.08	0.20 (-0.02)	0.14 (0.03)
Greater economic equality	0.57 (0.63)	0.08 (-0.06)	-0.14	0.08 (0.08)	0.00 (-0.11)
The rule of law	0.20 (0.11)	0.62 (0.61)	0.07	0.18 (0.08)	0.07 (0.12)
National greatness	0.14 (0.00)	0.78 (0.71)	0.06	0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.04)
Preserving the natural environment	0.34 (0.39)	0.16 (0.08)	0.10	0.00 (-0.07)	0.56 (0.38)
National economic development	0.19 (0.06)	0.72 (0.78)	0.24	0.03 (-0.09)	0.02 (0.11)

Note. This table presents the factor loadings from Study 1 and, in parentheses, the factor loadings from Study 2.

factors which were also relatively specific, having only one or two items loading saliently on them. The first was defined by the item, 'reward for individual effort'. On the second, 'upholding traditional sexual moral standards' and 'human dignity' had the most salient loadings. The third factor appears to represent an ideology of environmental conservation with major loadings for 'preserving the natural environment' and 'a world of beauty'.

Study 2. The data from the student population were analysed in the same way as those from the general population. Using the Kaiser-Guttman number of factors criterion, four factors were rotated which accounted for 57.0 per cent of the variance in the item set.

Once again the majority of the variance was explained by two factors. The first represented *international harmony and equality* (58.2 per cent). In addition to the items found to define the factor in Study 1, moderate loadings appeared for 'human dignity' and 'freedom'. Both were consistent with the earlier interpretation of the dimension. The second factor clearly represented *national strength and order* (27.7 per cent). The same items defined this factor as in the previous study, together with new moderate loadings on 'reward for individual effort' and 'man's domination of nature'.

The remaining two factors were again small and specific, defined by 'upholding traditional sexual moral standards' in one case, and 'a world of beauty' in the other. The factor not replicated in this study was that defined by 'reward for individual effort'. An

examination of the inter-item correlation matrix revealed that the pattern of relationships for this item differed markedly for the two samples. It seems likely that 'reward for individual effort' is plagued by ambiguity, having connotations of justice for the politically conservative, and of capitalist exploitation for those with a more radical perspective.

On the basis of these two studies, it can be concluded that data from two different populations, when independently factor analysed, yield comparable results, indicating two major orthogonal dimensions underlying the political ideology domain. These two dimensions accounted for 47.1 per cent of the total variance in the item set in one study and 49.0 per cent in the other. When specific item and error variance were excluded from consideration, the results were more impressive. Together, the two dimensions accounted for 77.5 per cent of the factored variance in Study 1, and 85.9 per cent in Study 2. The dimensions have been labelled *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*. These labels are based on no more than an analysis of the content of the most saliently loading items. The relationship of these dimensions to established psychological constructs, and in particular to Rokeach's constructs, has yet to be resolved.

Using the data from Study 2, scale scores were derived for respondents on the dimensions, *international harmony and equality* and *national strength and order*. The scales were comprised of those items which had loadings exceeding 0.4 in both studies. The scale scores were first related to Rokeach's measures of equality and freedom.

Not only did *international harmony and equality* correspond well to Rokeach's equality dimension at a conceptual level, but it did so at an empirical level. From Table 3, the correlation between them was quite substantial 0.63 ($n = 480$, $P < 0.001$).

Table 3. Product moment correlations of the factor analytically derived dimensions with Rokeach's measures and Scott's scales

Dimension	Rokeach's measures		Scott's scales ^a			
	Equality	Freedom	Humanitarianism	Pacifism	Nationalism	Power
International harmony and equality	0.63	0.43	0.37	0.26	-0.11	-0.07
National strength and order	0.08	0.20	-0.09	-0.07	0.53	0.53

^a Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients for the scales in this study were: humanitarianism 0.66; pacifism 0.50; nationalism 0.65; power 0.57.

The second orthogonal dimension, *national strength and order*, does not, however, appear to represent a similar construct to that measured by Rokeach's item, 'freedom (independence, free choice)'. In fact, the data suggest that freedom is more closely associated with *international harmony and equality* than with *national strength and order*.

Thus, while some claim can be made towards demonstrating the validity of equality as one major dimension underlying the political ideology domain, little support was found for the freedom dimension. Instead of freedom, the second major orthogonal dimension was *national strength and order*. Not surprisingly, the item from the Value Survey with which this dimension correlated most highly was 'national security' ($r = 0.61$, $n = 480$, $P < 0.001$).

In order to provide some data on the validity of the *international harmony and equality* and the *national strength and order* dimensions, the measures were correlated with Scott's Scales of Foreign Policy Goals. Scott identified two major and relatively unrelated clusters

of foreign policy goals, international cooperation and international competitiveness.

International cooperation was represented in the current study by the scales, humanitarianism and pacifism, whereas international competitiveness was represented by nationalism and power.

As expected, *national strength and order* was quite strongly related to both nationalism and power, the correlation coefficients being 0.53 ($n = 480$, $P < 0.001$) in both cases (see Table 3). In the case of *international harmony and equality*, the predicted relationships were considerably weaker, though quite significant. Humanitarianism had a moderate correlation of 0.37 with the dimension, while pacifism yielded a somewhat lower coefficient of 0.26. The strength of these correlations is not altogether surprising. At a conceptual level, the constructs appear to have a slightly different emphasis. One component of the *international harmony and equality* dimension that has already been shown to be of major importance, equality for all men and women, is outside the domain of foreign policy goals. Consequently, this concept is not represented among Scott's scales of international cooperation.

Finally, with regard to discriminant validity, it can be seen from Table 3 that the power and nationalism scales do not correlate significantly with *international harmony and equality*. Likewise, humanitarianism and pacifism are unrelated to *national strength and order*.

Discussion

The current study investigated the validity of Rokeach's (1973) two-dimensional model of political ideology. The data support the notion that there are two orthogonal dimensions underlying the political ideology domain, but suggest an alternative interpretation of the constructs they represent. The first dimension, while overlapping considerably with Rokeach's equality concept, also proved to be related to Scott's (1960) measures of humanitarianism and pacifism. Thus, the dimension was deserving of the broader label of *international harmony and equality*. The second dimension proved to be unrelated to the freedom dimension, at least as it has been measured by Rokeach. Instead it was substantially related to another of Rokeach's values, national security, and to Scott's nationalism and power scales. The dimension was defined as *national strength and order*.

These findings provide an explanation for why some items in the Value Survey, other than equality and freedom, have consistently discriminated among political groups in previous research (Rawls *et al.*, 1973; Rokeach, 1973; Rous & Lee, 1978; Cochrane *et al.*, 1979). Three values have been particularly notable in this regard: a world at peace, national security and a world of beauty. The first has emerged as an integral part of the *international harmony and equality* dimension. The second has been linked closely with *national strength and order*. The third, while not a major component of *international harmony and equality*, nevertheless proved to be weakly associated with the dimension in the factor analytic studies. Thus, a two-dimensional model of political ideology may still prove adequate. Certainly, at this stage, the available data do not justify abandoning parsimony for the sake of a more sophisticated model.

In order to integrate these findings with other research in the political ideology domain, *national strength and order* and *international harmony and equality* were likened to Scott's (1960) basic international ideologies of competition and cooperation respectively. This is not to suggest, however, that either conceptual schema is incompatible with that of Rokeach. The data simply point to a lack of congruence between Rokeach's measure of freedom and the second major dimension underlying the domain, *national strength and order*.

In fact, at one level of analysis, one could expect the freedom concept to be negatively

related to *natural strength and order*. Parallels can be drawn between the current factor-analytically derived two-dimensional structure and Fromm's (1949) typology of humanistic and authoritarian consciences. To the extent that authoritarianism can be equated with the *national strength and order* dimension, the basis of the compatibility between the present model and that of Rokeach becomes clear. An authoritarian ideology would involve obedience to authority and rigid rule-governed behaviour. Such an ideology represents the antithesis of freedom as the power of individuals to act as they like. Measures of freedom that adequately tap this meaning should be negatively related to *national strength and order*.

Alternatively, if freedom is defined in terms of a *laissez-faire* economic system, that is, freedom to compete for economic gain, a quite different result would be expected. On the basis of Kerlinger's (1967) study of social attitudes, freedom of this kind would be expected to correlate positively with *national strength and order*, since all are facets of conservative ideology.

Whether or not any of the above propositions can be empirically supported is a question to which future research should be addressed. As in previous research, the major problem surrounds the measurement of freedom. The concept itself is a multidimensional one. When broadly defined, individuals may opt for the meaning that makes freedom a value for them. It is generally accepted that values function as socially acceptable justifications for one's beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. Since freedom is so widely accepted and entrenched in the traditions of Western democratic societies, individuals must feel enormous pressures to find some way of paying lip service to it.

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